At various stages of completion or review, I have a paper on grammaticalized evidentials and the dispensability of speech acts like assertion, a paper on the pragmatics of hedging, a paper on theistic apophaticism, a paper on knowledge as the aim of inquiry, and a co-edited volume on unstructured theories of propositional content (with Dirk Kindermann and Andy Egan).
* = invited
- (forthcoming). Generic animalism (with Andrew Bailey). The Journal of Philosophy.
- (forthcoming). Why animalism matters (with Andrew Bailey, Allison Thornton). Philosophical Studies.
- (forthcoming). Reviving the performative hypothesis? Thought.
- (forthcoming). Hedging and the ignorance norm on inquiry (with Yasha Sapir). Synthese.
- (forthcoming). The linguistic basis for propositions. Routledge Handbook of Propositions. (ed.) C. Tillman. Routledge.*
- (2021). Representing knowledge. The Philosophical Review 130 (1), 97-143.
- (2020). That-clauses and propositional anaphors. Philosophical Studies 177 (10): 2861-2875.
- (2020). Hedged assertion (with Matthew Benton). Oxford Handbook of Assertion. (ed.) S. Goldberg. Oxford University Press. pp. 245-263.*
- (2020). Deceiving without answering. Philosophical Studies 177 (5): 1157-1173.
- (2020). What the metasemantics of know is not. Linguistics and Philosophy 43 (1): 69-82.
- (2020). Testimony and grammatical evidentials. Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. (eds.) M. Fricker, P. Graham, D. Henderson, N. Pedersen, J. Wyatt. Routledge. pp. 135-144.*
- (2019). Propositional anaphors. Philosophical Studies 76 (4): 1055-1075.
- (2018). Contrast and constitution. Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270): 158-174.
- (2015). Humean laws and circular explanation (with Michael Hicks). Philosophical Studies 172 (2): 433-443.
- (2020). Review of Semantics for Reasons by Bryan Weaver and Kevin Scharp (with Daniel Fogal). Ethics 131 (2): 420-427.
- (2013). Teaching philosophy through Lincoln-Douglas debate (with Jacob Nebel, Ryan Davis, Ben Holguin). Teaching Philosophy 36 (3): 271-289.