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The Attitudinal Effects of Minority Incorporation

Examining the Racial Dimensions of Trust in Urban America

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Although trust in government has been declining for all Americans, Black Americans continue to be significantly less trusting than their White counterparts. Scholars have typically relied on the *political reality model* to explain this gap, arguing that lower trust among Blacks stems from their exclusion from power. Given contemporary gains in Black office holding, we revisit this question in the context of urban politics. Based on a sample of 104 municipalities we find that Black descriptive representation has very limited direct effects on trust, but appears to affect the distribution of policing policies across cities, and that substantive police policies increase Black and White Americans' trust in local police. Overall, our findings extend conventional conceptualizations of substantive benefits while raising questions about the symbolic value of Black political representation.

Keywords: minority political incorporation; trust; police policy; urban politics

While numerous sources have cited a decline in trust in government for all Americans (Putnam 2000; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), Black Americans are generally much less trusting than their White counterparts (Marschall and Stolle 2004; Miller 1974). Indeed, this racial gap in trust has persisted since the Institute for Social Research began measuring political trust more than thirty five years ago. The explanation most commonly offered for the racial gap is the political reality model, which assumes that Blacks are treated less favorably by White political leaders and that Blacks are denied political power and voice (Abramson 1983; Foster 1978). Thus, the lower

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trust among Blacks is seen as a rational response to the political reality of their being disadvantaged.

However, the political reality for Blacks has changed considerably since the 1970s and 1980s. On one hand, Blacks have become increasingly incorporated into political life, especially at the local level. For example, the number of Black elected officials has increased substantially, from 1,469 in 1970 to over 9,000 in 2001 (Joint Center for Political Studies 2001). Evidence suggests that the impact of this political incorporation includes shifts in local policies toward Black preferences (e.g., Browning, Tabb, and Marshall 1984; Meier and England 1984), and positive changes in Black attitudes and behaviors, including higher levels of satisfaction, trust, efficacy, and political participation (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Gilliam 1996; Marschall and Ruhil 2007).[1]

On the other hand, concurrent with this increase in descriptive representation at the local level, the 1970s and 1980s marked the beginning of the most precipitous urban decline of the twentieth century (Walinsky 1995). Black Americans witnessed a high level of racial and economic segregation (Massey and Denton 1993), the loss of manufacturing jobs, and the increase in Black female-headed households in many of the same cities in which they had gained political representation (Reed 1988; Wilson 1987). As a result, even in cities where Blacks have gained political power, some studies have found that Blacks hold more negative views of city services—police, public schools, garbage collection, and parks—than Whites (Carlson 2002; Van Ryzin, Muzzio, and Immerwahr 2004; but see Marschall and Ruhil 2007). In other words, the gains in descriptive representation made by Blacks coincided with a period of urban decay, which may in turn have severely limited the ability of Black elected officials to pursue policies favorable to their Black constituents.

Yet this is an empirical question. The majority of research investigating the attitudinal effects of Black incorporation in local politics has been limited in its analytic scope. In particular, most studies have restricted their analysis to single, large cities (Emig, Hesse, and Fisher 1996; Howell and Fagan 1988; Jackson 1987) or to the period immediately following the election of the city's first Black mayor (Abney and Hutcheson 1981). Two notable exceptions (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Hajnal 2001) investigated attitudinal effects of local Black political incorporation based on larger samples and longer tenures of Black mayors. However, similar to other studies, they did not control for neighborhood- or city-level factors that serve as proxies for local public service provision or the constraints upon local elected officials to provide these services, thereby making it difficult to discern whether attitudinal effects are based on performance, race, or

both. Finally, extant research has tended to limit its analysis to trust in local or national government in general (Rahn and Rudolph 2005; Ulbig 2001, 2005), which conceptually is much harder to link to specific changes in descriptive representation or substantive policies.

Our study extends extant research and contributes to the literature on the attitudinal effects of Black descriptive representation and policy responsiveness. Three research questions motivate our work. First, controlling for individual-, neighborhood-, and city-level factors, to what extent does Black descriptive representation contribute to residents' trust in local government and local police? Second, do the effects of Black descriptive representation differ for Blacks and Whites? Third, are these attitudinal effects strictly symbolic or are they rooted in substantive policy and service delivery? Unlike previous studies that focus on a single or small set of cities and examine only general trust in government, our analysis combines data from several sources and allows us to tap not only individual-, neighborhood-, and city-level determinants of trust, but also the varied levels of Black descriptive representation within cities and the link between substantive policing policies and residents' trust in local police. Using a sample of 104 municipalities that vary with regard to levels of Black descriptive representation, size, geographic location, and demographic and other important background characteristics, our study offers a wider empirical focus than existing research and provides a unique opportunity to examine how descriptive and substantive representation shape Black and White trust in local institutions.

Explaining the Black-White Gap in Political Trust

Political trust has typically been defined as a basic evaluative orientation toward government and is based largely on how well individuals perceive government responding to their normative expectations (Miller 1974). The development of these normative expectations is the result of numerous factors, including individual-level attributes and predispositions, as well as contextual cues and characteristics. In this section, we describe one model that purports to explain the Black-White gap in political trust in America—the political reality model—and examine the empirical evidence to support its claims.

To understand the gap in Black and White trust in government, scholars have focused on the evaluative dimension of political orientation. In Miller's (1974) account, sustained discontent resulting from long-standing social conflict and Blacks' sense of insufficient political influence has purportedly been translated into negative orientations toward the political system. In other words, because they have historically perceived the political

system as unresponsive to their needs and preferences, Blacks feel government is generally not to be trusted. This explanation was later termed the *political reality model* by Abramson (1983), who argued that lower levels of political efficacy and trust among Blacks (relative to Whites) were based on Blacks' realization that they had less capacity to influence political leaders than Whites.

Earlier research by Schuman and Gruenberg (1970) supported this perspective. They found that cities experiencing major rioting in the 1960s had the highest level of Black distrust of city government and that Blacks tended to be most distrustful in cities where mayors were perceived as "more representative of Whites than of Blacks" (cf. Abney and Hutcheson 1981, 92). Similarly, in his examination of cynicism scores from the 1964 and 1970 National Election Studies, Miller (1974) found that respondents favoring forced integration had become discontent at a faster rate than respondents favoring segregation. Miller explains this finding as being partly driven by increased expectations after passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act: "The sharp decline in trust among Blacks may then have resulted from frustration arising from unfulfilled expectation of more active government in the area of integration" (Miller 1974, 958). The accumulated evidence therefore suggests that Blacks' distrust in government results from their dissatisfaction with policies and the associated frustration stemming from perceptions that they cannot influence policy processes or outcomes.

The Impact of Black Descriptive Representation on Blacks

Importantly, these early studies confirming the political reality model focused solely on social or psychological attributes, but had largely ignored how power arrangements might affect political attitudes. According to Abramson's (1983) conceptualization, levels of political trust and efficacy among Blacks should increase as Blacks gain political representation and power. In theory, these effects should also be the result of both symbolic cues and policy responsiveness.

The literature has tended to support the symbolic effects of Black descriptive representation. As Gilliam (1996) explains, the incorporation of Blacks into the political mainstream sends powerful cues to Blacks, raising group pride and conferring psychic benefits from the governing activities of Black politicians (see also Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989; Tate 1993). Early empirical tests of the political reality model supported this hypothesis. For instance, in their study of how the election of Atlanta's first Black mayor (Maynard Jackson) influenced Black and White residents' attitudes,

Abney and Hutcheson (1981) found no effect on trust among Whites, but a positive effect for Blacks. Additionally, Howell and Fagan (1988) found the presence of a Black mayor in New Orleans to be associated with higher levels of Black trust in government. And Bobo and Gilliam (1990) found that Blacks residing in Black "empowered" cities had higher levels of political trust, efficacy, and knowledge, and consequently exhibited markedly higher levels of political participation.[2]

Beyond this symbolic effect, however, the political reality model is rooted in the notion that gains in Black descriptive representation lead to the redirection of public resources such that government becomes more responsive to the needs and preferences of Black constituents. In other words, increases in Black representation in elective office lead to the increased ability of Blacks to influence policy processes and outcomes. This in turn should yield improvements in local services and enhanced benefits for Blacks, which then contribute to higher levels of satisfaction and ultimately increased trust in government. Despite the rather clearly defined causal mechanism described by the political reality model, to date few studies have empirically tested the links between descriptive representation, substantive policy, and attitudinal effects. Moreover, those who have examined these relationships have either found no relationship between descriptive representation and substantive policy outcomes (Tate 2003), or have not focused specifically on Blacks and Black representation (Ulbig 2001, 2005).

In sum, the evidence seems clear that Black political representation is good for Black residents, at least psychologically. Thus, we expect that Blacks in cities with higher levels of Black representation have higher levels of trust than their counterparts in cities where Blacks have lower levels of representation. Less clear, however, is the extent to which attitudinal effects associated with descriptive representation are rooted in substantive policy. Is political trust among Blacks shaped by both the symbolic effects of Black representation *and* substantive policy? Or do the symbolic effects wash out once measures of substantive policy are included? The present study tests this relationship directly and seeks to shed new empirical light on these fundamental questions.

Black Political Incorporation and Whites: A Zero-Sum Game?

Whereas Black political incorporation has been found to have positive effects on Blacks, the literature expects the opposite for Whites, where it has

often been conceptualized as a zero-sum game. Specifically, Black gains in political representation are typically accompanied by White losses, which in turn have been linked to declining trust in government and increasing racial polarization among Whites. A number of studies (Giles and Evans 1985, 1986; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000) have found that as the threat to the dominant group from the minority group increases, individuals belonging to the dominant group increasingly act to protect their interests. Challenges to White power and authority have thus been associated with higher White voter turnout, the defection of Whites from the Democratic Party (Lublin and Tate 1995; Watson 1984), and greater support for conservative Republicans (Giles and Buckner 1996; Hukfeldt and Kohfeld 1989).

Others have argued that the racial threat associated with Black political incorporation is actually time- and information-bound. According to this perspective, since White voters initially do not have personal experience with Black leadership, racial threat holds only for those residents who have most recently elected Black officials. In such cities, Whites allegedly tend to rely on racial stereotypes for information about how Blacks are likely to behave once elected (Conover and Feldman 1989). Given structural limitations imposed on local politicians, however, their initial fears of policy changes that disproportionately benefit minorities are likely to prove unfounded. As Hajnal (2001, 603) notes, for the vast majority of Whites, experiences under Black leadership have been almost identical to experiences under White leadership, thus leading to his finding that Whites living in Black-empowered cities actually changed their racial attitudes over time, becoming *more* favorable of Blacks the longer the Black mayor had been in office.

Taken in sum, prior research suggests that the potential reaction among White residents to Black political incorporation depends on the length of time Blacks have held important elective offices in a city, and the extent to which White residents face substantial policy changes in their communities. Although initial reactions may be threat-based, as Whites come to learn that spending patterns or policy priorities have not been radically altered (as Hajnal suggests), they should not evince significantly different levels of trust in government than their counterparts in non-Black-empowered cities. However, the relationship between Black descriptive representation and Whites' trust in governmental institutions, controlling for substantive policies, has not been tested (but see Howell, Perry, and Vile 2004). We address this gap in our project by specifically investigating how police policies impact White residents' trust in local police.

Impact of Contextual Factors

In addition to Black descriptive representation and substantive policies implemented by municipal governments, other city-level factors might also influence trust in local institutions. In their multilevel analysis of trust in local government, Rahn and Rudolph (2005) provide the most comprehensive investigation of these factors, which include environmental variables (size, socioeconomic status), political institutions (structure of municipal government, metropolitan fragmentation), political culture (Elazar's [1984] typology), civic capacity (degree of social engagement), and community heterogeneity (ethnic fractionalization, income inequality, political polarization). Their findings indicate that while most of the city-level variables are not significant predictors of trust in local government, the degree of community heterogeneity plays an important role in shaping residents' trust.

Heterogeneity exacts a toll on political trust in two distinct ways: by increasing residents' beliefs that government policy is unrepresentative and by decreasing government effectiveness (Rahn and Rudolph 2005). In the case of the former, it is essentially the problem that the more ideologically, racially/ethnically, and economically diverse the local population is, the greater the range of interests and preferences that government must satisfy and, consequently, the less likely it is that government will satisfy most of the people most of the time. At the same time, heterogeneity can also reduce government efficiency because of the increased amount of time and complexity associated with government decision making. As Rahn and Rudolph (2005) put it, racial/ethnic diversity, income inequality, and political polarization make it difficult to achieve community cohesion, thereby reducing the capacity of local governments to function fairly.

While these city-level indicators have been found to impact political trust, research also suggests that neighborhood context plays a role in shaping individual attitudes. That is, since political trust is partly a function of the evaluation of local public services, and because service delivery occurs at even more disaggregate levels, typically neighborhoods, it is important to consider the characteristics of these units as well. In particular, the racial and socioeconomic characteristics of urban neighborhoods appear to matter most.

First, the clustering of households into relatively homogeneous socioeconomic and racial neighborhoods is associated with variations in the conditions and quality of life in these neighborhoods. For example, predominantly Black and other minority neighborhoods in U.S. cities tend to be poorer and often have higher rates of crime and unemployment (Fronczek 2005). In turn, these differences in neighborhood conditions are likely to correspond to different

experiences with local government and urban service provision, and ultimately to differences in service expectations (DeHoog, Lowery, and Lyons 1990). For example, in their assessment of satisfaction with urban services in New York City, Van Ryzin, Muzzio, and Immerwahr (2004) found that the residential segregation of Blacks and Hispanics into poorer, more racially homogeneous neighborhoods was associated with greater dissatisfaction with urban services, such as schools, police protection, and parks.

Second, since many types of political behavior are conditioned by neighborhood context (Brooks and Prysby 1991; Hukfeldt 1986), the racial and socioeconomic characteristics of neighborhoods may also be associated with different patterns of political behavior (Alex-Assensoh 1997; Marschall 2004). Studies have found that individuals living in lower-income neighborhoods are less likely to engage in communal or social activities (Giles and Dantico 1982; Hukfeldt 1983), and among Blacks, Cohen and Dawson (1993) find that residence in high-poverty neighborhoods reduces the likelihood of belonging to voluntary or church groups, talking to family or friends about politics, having indirect contact with public officials, attending meetings about community problems, or giving money to candidates, groups, or political parties. This lack of participation among residents of lower-status neighborhoods is in turn likely to contribute to poorer conditions and lower-quality services in these neighborhoods.

Finally, in addition to evaluations of government services and performance in general, neighborhood context has also been strongly linked to residents' perceptions of local policing in particular (Alpert and Dunham 1988; Apple and O'Brien 1983; Klinger 1997; Smith 1986; Weitzer 1995). Studies have found that residents of White and Black neighborhoods differ in their attitudes toward police, largely because police practices vary between White and Black neighborhoods (Langan et al. 2001; Smith 1986). For example, Blacks are more likely than Whites to report having experienced involuntary, uncivil, or adversarial contacts with the police; to be stopped, questioned, and/or searched without cause or due process; and to experience verbal or physical abuse (Browning et al. 1994; Flanagan and Vaughn 1996). In addition, because crime rates are typically higher in poor neighborhoods (regardless of race), residents in these neighborhoods are also more likely to have involuntary encounters with police (Bordua and Tifft 1971; Hahn 1971; Weitzer and Tuchs 1999). Thus, living in neighborhoods with larger concentrations of Blacks or low-income residents is associated with more negative interactions with the police, and this in turn is related to less favorable evaluations of the police.

In sum, studies investigating the determinants of political trust, and more specifically, the source of the racial gap in political trust, have pointed to differences among Black and White residents in terms of their contextual characteristics and cues, their evaluations of government performance and processes, and the symbolic and substantive effects of political incorporation. Unfortunately, none of this previous work included all of these explanatory factors in a single model, and few studies have simultaneously analyzed a large sample of both cities and neighborhoods. Our empirical analyses address these limitations and thus provide a rare opportunity to evaluate the relative contribution of each of these explanatory factors.

Data, Measures, and Research Hypotheses

To investigate how Black descriptive representation as well as city-, neighborhood-, and individual-level factors shape Black and White trust, our empirical analysis relies on a dataset constructed from multiple sources. For individual-level data, we utilize the *Social Capital Community Benchmark Study* (SCCBS), a large-scale survey of residents in 41 "areas" located in 26 U.S. states conducted in 2000–2001.[3] Using geographic identifiers (Federal Information Processing Standards codes) for counties and municipalities, we constructed a sample of 104 municipalities from the larger set of jurisdictions included in the area surveys.

The SCCBS survey included a battery of questions that tapped respondents' levels of trust in a wide range of different groups and institutions. Given our focus on contextual factors and Black representation in local government, we focus on two measures in particular: trust in local government and trust in local police. City- and neighborhood-level indicators come from 2000 Census data, matched via geographic indicators (at the city and tract level) to the SCCBS data.[4] To measure Black representation in local government, we used Black elected official rosters compiled by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Research. Finally, to investigate how substantive policy influences levels of trust, we also included measures of police policy and responsiveness from the Justice Department's 2000 *Survey of Law Enforcement Agencies* (LEMAS) (U.S. Dept. of Justice 2003).

The basic model we estimate can be summarized as follows:

Trust in Local Institutions = *f* (Black Descriptive Representation,
                     City-Level Factors, Neighborhood
                     Context, and Individual-Level Factors).

In our second set of analyses, we add the vector of explanatory variables capturing *substantive policies* within the domain of policing. Including these variables allows us to determine how actual policies impact residents' trust in local police, whether including these variables attenuates potential effects of Black political representation (or other city or neighborhood factors), and whether the effects of specific substantive police policies are different for Blacks and Whites.

Our two dependent variables, *trust in local government* and *trust local police*, are based on survey questions that asked respondents how much they could trust the institution in question (0 = *not much/a little*; 1 = *some/a lot*).[5]

To measure *Black descriptive representation* we include two measures. One is a binary indicator of whether the city had a *Black mayor* in office during the survey period (1 = *yes*). The other measures the average percentage of Blacks on city council (*Black legislative representation*) from 1995 to 2000.[6] This broader measurement approach is preferred to one that looks exclusively at the mayor's office, since it more accurately captures the nature and extent of Black descriptive representation in local government (see also Emig, Hesse, and Fisher 1996).[7] A positive and statistically significant coefficient on these two variables will lend support to the argument that Black representation in local government has a favorable (symbolic) effect on Blacks' evaluations of local government and police, whereas a negative coefficient will demonstrate the opposite. When it comes to Whites, we expect the signs on these coefficients to be in the opposite direction if racial threat is at work. Null effects suggest that Black descriptive representation has no influence on trust in local government or police.

Our vector of *city-level factors* includes four separate measures, one controlling for *city size* in 2000 (logged) and three that tap the degree of heterogeneity in the city. The first focuses on income heterogeneity and, given our focus on Blacks and Whites, measures the absolute difference between Black and White median family income (*income differential*) in thousands of dollars based on 2000 Census data. The second measures the degree of *political polarization* in the city. Following Rahn and Rudolph (2005), we construct this measure by computing the standard deviation of individual-level responses to the survey question that asked about respondents' political ideology.[8] The larger the standard deviation for these aggregated, city-specific responses, the greater the variation in residents' political ideologies and thus the more political polarization present in the city. Our third measure taps the degree of *racial/ethnic heterogeneity* in the city. We use a Herfindahl-type fractionalization index, which ranges from

0 (maximum racial/ethnic homogeneity) to 1 (maximum racial/ethnic hetero-geneity).[9] Since increasing political, racial/ethnic, and income heterogeneity have been linked to reduced government efficiency and responsiveness, we expect these measures to be negatively associated with trust in local government and police. Finally, we expect city size to be negatively related to trust since government is more distant from citizens as the city size increases.

Neighborhood context includes two variables that capture the racial and socioeconomic characteristics of residents' neighborhoods: *percent Black tract* and *median family income* (logged), both based on 2000 Census tract-level data. At this more disaggregated level, we expect these measures to primarily tap neighborhood conditions associated with service needs or service provision/quality. We expect median family income to be positively related to trust since higher-status neighborhoods are more likely to receive higher-quality services and to generally have a higher quality of life. On the other hand, low-income neighborhoods not only tend to be characterized by more disadvantaged residents, but as Ross, Mirowsky, and Pribesh (2001) demonstrate, net of individual disadvantage, residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods have low levels of trust as a result of high levels of neighborhood disorder. Given variation in police practices across White and Black neighborhoods (Langan et al. 2001; Smith 1986), we expect the percentage of Black residents in the tract to be negatively related to trust in police.

Individual-level factors include a vector of variables that tap demographic, behavioral, and attitudinal covariates of trust. The set of demographic control variables includes *length of residence* in the community (years) and *Education*,[10] as well as binary variables for *marital*, *employment*, and *homeowner* status (1 = *yes*), and *female* (1 = *yes*). Much of the extant research finds that local stakeholders (residents of higher socioeconomic status, longer lengths of residency, employment, and homeownership) tend to contact government more frequently and as a result be more satisfied with local services (Serra 1995).

In addition to these demographic controls, we also include several variables that tap respondents' psychological and behavioral attachments to their communities. As Hetherington (1998) notes, political trust should depend on the distribution of positive and negative information people receive about government. Thus, the more engaged they are in local affairs, the more information they are likely to have about whether the government is pursuing policy goals with which they agree, whether these policies are working effectively, and ultimately whether they should trust local institu-

tions. Two variables in particular get at this information-based dimension: *read newspaper* measures the number of days in the past week respondents reported reading a daily newspaper (0–7) and *participate in a neighborhood group* measures whether respondents participate in neighborhood associations like a homeowner/tenant associations or crime watch (1 = *yes*). We do not assume a directional relationship here, since this relationship depends on the nature of the information respondents' gain from their engagement. Instead, our measures simply control for the amount of information respondents are likely to have.

Two other measures tap more directly the likelihood that respondents support local government policies or at least feel that their needs and preferences are being considered in the policy-making process: *community efficacy* is based on a survey question that asked respondents about the perceived impact of people like themselves on making the community a better place to live (1 = *no impact at all*; 4 = *a big impact*), whereas *ideology* measures respondents' self-identified political ideology (1 = *very conservative*; 5 = *very liberal*).[11] While in general conservatives (liberals) should worry less about government undermining their interests when they perceive that the government is pursing conservative (liberal) ends, given the greater support of government among liberals, we expect this relationship to be positive in our model of trust in local government. However, the relationship between ideology and trust in police is likely to be the opposite, since here conservatives tend to be more supportive of law and order than liberals. In addition to these two measures, we control for interpersonal or *generalized trust*,[12] since extant research has shown that confidence in institutions is linked to the level of confidence individuals have in one another (Brehm and Rahn 1997, 1015).

Finally, in our second set of analyses, we add a vector of *substantive policy* variables related to public safety and policing. These measures come from the 2000 LEMAS. In particular, we include a measure of the *proportion of Blacks on the police force* (sworn officers), whether the city has an independent *civilian review board* that investigates excessive use of force among police officers (1 = *yes*), whether the agency has a special unit or personnel for *community policing* (1 = *yes*) or does *outreach* with tenant associations in the city (1 = *yes*), and the *per capita expenditures* for the police department. Procedural justice research suggests that the process of policing may matter more than the outcomes (Lind and Tyler 1988; Thibaut and Walker 1975). That is, residents may judge urban services in terms of the social inclusiveness and perceived fairness of the institutions and personnel that provide the service. This procedural justice argument suggests

that police outreach and programs aimed at providing citizens with a voice in the process of policing, as well as higher per capita expenditures devoted to public safety, may contribute to higher levels of trust. Additionally, among Blacks, a larger percentage of Black police officers on the force is presumed to increase the likelihood of trusting the police.

In Table 1 we report descriptive statistics for Black and White respondents separately, since all of our models are estimated on these separate samples. In general, Blacks and Whites differ significantly on nearly all of the indicators reported in Table 1. In particular, levels of trust among Blacks are lower than Whites for local government and local police, a pattern consistent with extant research. Corroborating our discussion of racial and socioeconomic segregation, Black respondents are more likely to live in neighborhoods with more Blacks and where median incomes are lower. Black respondents are also more likely to live in cities governed by Black mayors and with greater Black legislative representation. Finally, Blacks are also significantly more likely to live in cities that have police policies that emphasize procedural justice and community outreach, where Blacks comprise a larger proportion of the sworn officers, and where per capita police budgets are larger.

Analysis and Findings

To estimate our models of *trust in local government* and *trust in local police* we employ probit models and report the marginal effects of these estimates using Stata's dprobit routine. In addition, given clustering within cities, we estimate robust standard errors, which allows us to address one of the fundamental problems encountered in estimating multilevel models: the fact that lower-level observations (residents) are nested within a higher level (cities) and consequently are not independent.[13] In Tables 2 and 3 we report results for the two trust measures and in Table 4 we add the substantive policing variables to the *trust in police* model. In addition to estimating separate models for the sample of Black and White respondents, for each analysis we also estimate a baseline model, which omits several behavioral and attitudinal variables that may be more difficult to establish as exogenous given the cross-sectional nature of the survey data, as well as the city-level measure of political ideology.[14] The baseline models demonstrate that our basic pattern of results is not affected by the inclusion of these additional variables, thereby increasing the validity of our findings.

The first thing to note with regard to the results reported in Tables 2 and 3 is the consistent null effects of Black descriptive representation in the models

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Sample[a]

Variable	Black Respondents		White Respondents	
	Mean	*St Dev*	*Mean*	*St Dev*
Dependent variables				
Trust in local government	.279	.449	.437	.496
Trust in local police	.645	.479	.893	.309
Individual-level demographics				
Education	3.22	1.66	4.09	1.85
Female	.643	.479	.585	.493
Married	.298	.457	.474	.499
Employed	.655	.475	.673	.469
Homeowner	.503	.500	.687	.463
Years lived in the community	3.41	1.47	3.72	1.50
Individual-level attitudes and behaviors				
Generalized trust	.261	.439	.566	.496
Ideology	2.96	1.17	2.90	1.14
Community efficacy	3.16	.842	3.08	.818
Read newspaper	3.28	2.77	3.81	2.89
Participate in neighborhood group	.306	.461	.282	.450
Neighborhood context				
Median family income at tract (log)	10.47	.443	10.87	.405
Percent black at tract	55.50	33.37	11.22	17.14
City-level factors				
Black-White income differential				
($1,000s)	$129.03	$67.59	$115.76	$63.86
Political polarization	1.15	.074	1.11	.086
City size (log)	12.60	1.02	12.18	1.16
Racial/ethnic heterogeneity	.554	.107	.514	.158
Black descriptive representation				
Black mayor	.408	.491	.270	.444
Percent Black council	32.54	21.30	18.54	18.09
Substantive policy				
Proportion Black on police force	.234	.158	.127	.112
Outreach to tenants' groups	.723	.448	.632	.482
Community policing unit	.850	.357	.834	.372
Civilian review board	.630	.483	.511	.500
Police budget (per capita)	$270	$163	$223	$232
Number of cities/number of respondents[b]	73/1685		102/6010	

a. T-tests for difference of means yield *p*-values of .01 or smaller for all variables except Ideology ($p < .05$), Participate in Neighborhood Group ($p < .10$), employed ($p < .17$), Community Policing ($p < .13$).

b. The mean number of respondents per city for the Black and White samples is 302.5 and 254.8, respectively. Standard deviations are 161.5 and 160.9, and ranges are 4, 514 and 2, 514, respectively. Less than 5% (9%) of respondents in the Black (White) sample live in cities with fewer than 30 respondents, and of these cities, the majority have more than 15 (16) respondents.

Table 2
Determinants of Trust in Local Government

	Blacks		Whites	
	Baseline	Full	Baseline	Full
Generalized trust	—	0.122*** (0.033)	—	0.169*** (0.012)
Female	0.001 (0.024)	−0.007 (0.025)	−0.006 (0.011)	−0.010 (0.011)
Education	0.010 (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)	0.017*** (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)
Married	−0.006 (0.022)	−0.012 (0.023)	0.023* (0.014)	0.014 (0.014)
Employed	−0.041** (0.019)	−0.043** (0.020)	−0.027** (0.014)	−0.043*** (0.014)
Homeowner	0.042 (0.026)	0.028 (0.025)	0.008 (0.018)	−0.005 (0.019)
Years lived in the community	−0.004 (0.006)	−0.007 (0.007)	0.007 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)
Ideology	0.005 (0.010)	0.004 (0.010)	−0.002 (0.005)	−0.007 (0.006)
Community efficacy	—	0.057*** (0.012)	—	0.068*** (0.007)
Read newspaper	0.007** (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)
Participate in neighborhood group	—	0.030 (0.024)	—	0.003 (0.013)
Median family income tract (log)	0.055* (0.033)	0.050* (0.030)	0.101*** (0.020)	0.077*** (0.020)
Percent Black at tract	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Income differential ($1,000s)	0.000 (0.000)	−0.000 (0.000)	−0.001*** (0.000)	−0.001*** (0.000)
Political polarization	—	−0.032 (0.146)	—	−0.152 (0.130)
City size (log)	−0.020 (0.012)	−0.019 (0.014)	−0.015* (0.008)	−0.011 (0.008)
Racial/ethnic heterogeneity	0.350*** (0.125)	0.393*** (0.126)	0.060 (0.072)	0.090 (0.069)
Black mayor	0.029 (0.025)	0.023 (0.026)	−0.002 (0.022)	−0.008 (0.022)
Percent Black council	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	−0.000 (0.000)	−0.000 (0.001)
Intercept	−2.437 (1.111)	−2.753 (1.182)	−2.716 (0.629)	−2.361 (0.718)
N	1,566	1,562	5,762	5,733
chi²	44.86***	142.87***	178.5***	702.71***

Note: Table entries are transformed probabilities from probit models and indicate the change in probability of Y for a one–unit change in X when X is set at its mean; for binary independent variables, it is the change in the probability of Y for a discrete change in X from 0 to 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*p < .05, one-tailed test. **p < .01.

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Table 3
Determinants of Trust in Local Police

	Blacks		Whites	
	Baseline	Full	Baseline	Full
Generalized trust	—	0.169*** (0.019)	—	0.078*** (0.008)
Female	0.104*** (0.026)	0.094*** (0.026)	0.051*** (0.009)	0.047*** (0.009)
Education	0.008 (0.006)	–0.003 (0.006)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.002)
Married	0.070*** (0.027)	0.062** (0.025)	0.034*** (0.008)	0.027*** (0.008)
Employed	–0.018 (0.022)	–0.021 (0.022)	0.013 (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)
Homeowner	0.087*** (0.022)	0.073*** (0.024)	0.020** (0.008)	0.013* (0.007)
Years lived in the community	–0.002 (0.008)	–0.005 (0.008)	0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
Ideology	–0.017 (0.011)	–0.018 (0.012)	–0.019*** (0.005)	–0.020*** (0.004)
Community efficacy	—	0.056*** (0.018)	—	0.025*** (0.004)
Read newspaper	–0.000 (0.003)	–0.002 (0.003)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
Participate in neighborhood group	—	0.029 (0.029)	—	0.005 (0.008)
Median family income tract (log)	–0.001 (0.037)	–0.016 (0.034)	0.035*** (0.012)	0.024** (0.011)
Percent Black at tract	–0.000 (0.000)	–0.000 (0.000)	–0.000 (0.000)	–0.000 (0.000)
Income differential ($1,000s)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	–0.000 (0.000)	–0.000 (0.000)
Political polarization	—	–0.112 (0.146)	—	0.000 (0.052)
City size (log)	0.005 (0.011)	0.007 (0.012)	–0.012*** (0.005)	–0.010** (0.004)
Racial/ethnic heterogeneity	–0.192 (0.134)	–0.169 (0.127)	0.083** (0.039)	0.087** (0.036)
Black mayor	–0.032 (0.029)	–0.038 (0.030)	–0.005 (0.010)	–0.007 (0.010)
Percent Black council	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)
Intercept	0.284 (1.151)	0.537 (1.198)	–0.825 (0.878)	–0.919 (0.915)
N	1,565	1,558	5,748	5,718
Chi²	93.10***	234.89***	324.93***	515.77***

Note: Table entries are transformed probabilities from probit models and indicate the change in probability of Y for a one-unit change in X when X is set at its mean; for binary independent variables, it is the change in the probability of Y for a discrete change in X from 0 to 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*$p < .05$, one-tailed test. **$p < .01$.

for Blacks. It appears that neither the presence of a Black mayor nor greater Black representation on city council affects Blacks' propensity to trust their local government or their local police.[15] For Whites, the null effects for Black mayors are again consistent; however, when it comes to trust in local police, the results indicate that Whites in cities with higher percentages of Blacks on city council are more likely to say their police can be trusted. Although substantively these effects are rather small, if they are driven by substantive changes in police policy, they suggest that councils with more Black members may be more responsive to constituents' concerns regarding policing and public safety issues, may engage in increased outreach in communities, or may serve as better advocates on these issues. While our data do not allow us to identify the causal mechanism driving these results, they do indicate that regardless of the race of the mayor, greater Black representation on city council is associated with greater trust in local police among White residents.

With regard to the effects of city- and neighborhood-level variables, we find relatively consistent effects for neighborhood socioeconomic status. Specifically, living in more affluent neighborhoods (as measured by tract-level median family income) increases the likelihood that both Black and White residents trust local government. These effects hold only for Whites when it comes to trust in local police. Effects of the city-level variables are more mixed and indicate stronger differences across race of respondents and the specific institution in question. For instance, city size is negatively associated with trust in both local government and police for Whites, but is unrelated to trust among Blacks. Similarly, Whites in cities with larger disparities in Black and White median family income are less likely to trust their local government, though substantively these effects are extremely small and do not appear in the *trust in police* model. Finally, the effects of racial/ethnic heterogeneity are positive and significant with regard to Blacks' trust in local government and Whites' trust in local police. This pattern is counter to what we expected and suggests that racial and ethnic diversity may work differently on trust than other dimensions of heterogeneity. It is worth noting that the nonsignificance of most of the city-level variables does not appear to be the result of multicollinearity.[16]

Finally, although the pattern of findings with respect to individual-level correlates is similar across Black and White respondents in the *trust in government* model, there are some notable differences in the *trust in police* model. Specifically, higher levels of education and newspaper readership are associated with greater propensity to trust police only among White respondents. Similarly more liberal ideology is associated with less trust for Whites only. On the other hand, females, married respondents, homeowners, and

individuals with a greater sense of community efficacy and more generalized trust are more likely to trust police regardless of their race.

Overall, although these models conform to expectations with regard to the effects of neighborhood- and individual-level variables, our hypotheses regarding the effects of Black descriptive representation were largely unconfirmed. To be sure, by including a large set of additional city-level covariates, our test of these effects is an extremely difficult one. However, missing from these models are variables that tap the actual substantive policies in place in these cities. If trust in local institutions is based on evaluations of service quality and government performance, then we need to include these measures as well. Otherwise, some of the estimates in these models may be the result of spurious relationships or omitted-variable bias.

Furthermore, Black and White respondents differ significantly with regard to both whether the cities in which they live have adopted the police policy measures reported in Table 1, and whether Black mayors govern their cities. While we cannot sort out the causal relationship between Black mayors and the adoption of these police policies in our cross-sectional analysis, we can improve upon these models by simultaneously including both sets of measures. If people perceive that government is pursuing policy goals with which they agree or perceive policies to be working effectively, they should trust the government and police more (Hetherington 1998). Thus, the *trust in police* models we estimate in Table 4 provide leverage in testing whether potential attitudinal effects are the result of Black descriptive representation, substantive police policies, or both.

Similar to the previous analysis, we again estimate a baseline and a fully specified model for the subsample of Black and White respondents. The results show that while there are similarities in the effects of the substantive police measures across Black and White residents, specifically the positive effects of police outreach to tenant groups, there are also significant differences. In particular, the percentage of Blacks among the ranks of the city's sworn officers has a substantial effect on Black residents' trust: for every one percentage point increase, Blacks' likelihood of trusting the police increases by 3.1 percentage points. On the other hand, Blacks who live in cities with civilian review boards are significantly less likely to trust police. One explanation for this finding is that the necessity of having a civilian review board indicates a problem of excessive force among the police. For Whites, the presence of community policing units has a significant, though somewhat negligible effect (2.5 percentage points) on trusting police.

The inclusion of these substantive police policy variables has also attenuated the effect of Black council representation on Whites' trust in police.

Table 4
Descriptive and Substantive Determinants of Trust in Local Police

	Blacks		Whites	
	Baseline	Full	Baseline	Full
Generalized trust	—	0.171*** (0.018)	—	0.076*** (0.008)
Female	0.102*** (0.028)	0.092*** (0.028)	0.050*** (0.009)	0.046*** (0.009)
Education	0.007 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.0128*** (0.003)	0.008** (0.002)
Married	0.065** (0.027)	0.058** (0.025)	0.028*** (0.008)	0.022*** (0.008)
Employed	-0.026 (0.022)	-0.028 (0.022)	0.018** (0.008)	0.014* (0.007)
Homeowner	0.091*** (0.022)	0.077*** (0.023)	0.017* (0.009)	0.011 (0.008)
Years lived in the community	-0.002 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.008)	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)
Ideology	-0.015 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.012)	-0.018*** (0.005)	-0.020*** (0.005)
Community efficacy	—	0.063*** (0.017)	—	0.025*** (0.004)
Read newspaper	0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.003** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
Participate in neighborhood group	—	0.018 (0.029)	—	0.009 (0.008)
Median family income tract (log)	-0.026 (0.038)	-0.044 (0.034)	0.041*** (0.013)	0.030*** (0.012)
Percent Black at tract	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Proportion Black on police force	0.200 (0.127)	0.310*** (0.136)	-0.018 (0.057)	-0.016 (0.054)
Outreach to tenants' groups	0.055*** (0.017)	0.059*** (0.017)	0.034*** (0.011)	0.029*** (0.010)
Community policing unit	0.037 (0.031)	0.041 (0.034)	0.023 (0.016)	0.025* (0.015)
Civilian review board for excessive force	-0.093*** (0.028)	-0.084*** (0.031)	0.010 (0.014)	0.009 (0.014)
Police budget (per capita)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Income differential ($1,000s)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Political polarization	—	-0.302* (0.171)	—	0.001 (0.060)
City size (log)	0.023 (0.016)	0.020 (0.018)	-0.018*** (0.005)	-0.015*** (0.005)

(continued)

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Table 4 (continued)

	Blacks		Whites	
	Baseline	Full	Baseline	Full
Racial/ethnic heterogeneity	−0.117 (0.190)	0.044 (0.173)	0.049 (0.049)	0.055 (0.044)
Percent Black council	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Black mayor	−0.025 (0.023)	−0.035 (0.023)	0.003 (0.010)	0.000 (0.009)
Intercept	0.215 (1.119)	1.035 (1.203)	−0.959 (0.853)	−1.111 (0.893)
N	1,531	1,525	5,110	5,083
Chi^2	190.92***	462.59***	268.47***	450.14***

Note: Table entries are transformed probabilities from probit models and indicate the change in probability of Y for a one-unit change in X when X is set at its mean; for binary independent variables, it is the change in the probability of Y for a discrete change in X from 0 to 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*$p < .05$, one-tailed test. **$p < .01$

For both models in Table 4, this effect is no longer statistically significant. As we discuss in more detail in the next section, that the direct effect of descriptive representation goes away once controls for substantive representation are included suggests that they were not simply symbolic, but rather rooted in real policy change.

With regard to neighborhood- and city-level variables, the results in Table 4 indicate socioeconomic status (as measured by tract-level median family income) continues to have positive effects on Whites' trust in police, whereas for Blacks, what appears to matter is the percentage of other Blacks living in their neighborhood. This effect is negative and relatively small (0.1%). In terms of city-level effects, for Blacks the degree of political polarization now has a significant, negative effect on trust in police. On the other hand, racial/ethnic heterogeneity is no longer associated with trust. The significant effect of this covariate in the earlier model was likely due to the omission of the police policy variables. Indeed, the pairwise correlations between *racial/ethnic heterogeneity* and the substantive police policy measures, for White respondents, are positive and significant at the .01 level. This suggests that for Whites, the set of police policies examined in this study are more prevalent in cities with greater racial/ethnic heterogeneity. These policies in turn, are associated with greater trust in the local police.[17]

Finally, with regard to the effects of individual-level variables, the results in Table 4 are largely unchanged in comparison to those reported in Table 3.

Implications and Discussion

In this study we sought to revisit the issue of the Black-White gap in political trust by investigating two institutions in particular: local government and local police. Given contemporary gains in Black office holding and the demographic and socioeconomic changes occurring in American cities over the past several decades, the political reality of Black Americans is clearly different today than it was in the 1970s and 1980s. What our study reveals, however, is that the Black-White gap in political trust remains. Specifically, whereas 89% of Whites reported trusting the police some or a lot, only 64% of Blacks felt this way. Similarly, 44% of Whites said they trusted local government some or a lot, whereas only 28% of Blacks expressed this sentiment. To be sure, the Black-White gap in political trust represents one of the most persistent and powerful characteristics of American political life.

Yet, it would seem that in places where Black Americans have made larger gains in office holding and where they have secured greater political power,

their evaluations of how well government is responding to their normative expectations should have improved. Moreover, according to the racial threat thesis, these changes in representation and power should correspond to less favorable evaluations of government among White Americans. What we find, however, is very little evidence that Black descriptive representation *alone* contributes to Black Americans' trust in local institutions, and evidence that among Whites, when Black descriptive representation matters it has positive rather than negative effects. How can we reconcile these findings and at the same time draw some inferences about the potential ways in which descriptive and substantive representation are related?

First, implicit in the political reality model originally espoused by Abramson (1983) is the idea that Black residents view the symbolic victory of political representation as the *first step* toward substantive policy change. In other words, descriptive representation alone may not be enough; rather, attitudinal change may occur only as a result of more substantive policy shifts. Since scholars have emphasized the evaluative dimension of orientations such as trust in governmental institutions, and because most theories of descriptive representation implicitly assume a causal process that leads to changes in substantive policy outcomes, to properly investigate the attitudinal effects of representation it is imperative to include measures of substantive policies that reflect government responsiveness to their constituents in these policy areas. In other words, what policy changes have resulted from Black representation in government? Second, it is important to take into account whether Black elected officials have had sufficient time in office to make progress in altering policy processes and outcomes (see, e.g., Hajnal 2001).

Although our data do not allow us to determine when or how cities in our sample adopted the policing policies we examine, our data suggest that Black political incorporation may explain some of the differences in policing policies and practices across cities where White and Black respondents live. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate these differences across four of the five policing policies for Black and White respondents respectively.

These figures show that cities with Black mayors and above-average levels of Black council representation have significantly greater proportions of Black sworn officers on the police force and are significantly more likely to have civilian review boards than those without Black mayors or with below-average levels of Black council representation. Black council representation is also associated with higher incidence rates of community policing, and in the cities where Whites live, more outreach with tenant groups. In addition, per capita budgets (not shown in these figures) are significantly higher in cities with Black mayors or higher levels of Black council representation

Figure 1
Substantive Police Policies by Level of
**Black Political Incorporation: Black Respondents**

Note: LoBlkLegRep = below average (30.5%) Black council representation in cities where Black respondents reside. HiBlkLegRep = greater than average Black council representation. With the exception of *CmtyPol* for mayors and *Outreach* for councils, all differences are significant at $p \leq .05$, two-tailed test.

across both White and Black respondents.[18] Although certainly not conclusive, these bivariate relationships suggest that Black descriptive representation is associated with higher rates of policing policies and practices that matter for Blacks *and* Whites.

With respect to the question of whether Black elected officials in these cities had sufficient time in office to effect change, the answer is *yes*. In these cities Black representation in the mayor's office and on city council is not novel. For example, of the fifteen cities with Black mayors in office in 2000, only five (Pasadena and San Francisco, California; Lewiston, Maine; Kalamazoo, Michigan; Seattle and Tacoma, Washington) had non-Black mayors in office for one or more years between 1995 and 1999.[19] And, since 1970, the average number of years Black mayors held office in these cities was 11.7.

Based on the multivariate analyses reported in Table 4, we find that substantive police policies explain a substantial amount of variation in the likelihood of trusting local police and that these policies differ for Blacks and Whites. In conjunction with the evidence presented in Figures 1 and 2 and

Figure 2
Substantive Police Policies by Level of
Black Political Incorporation: White Respondents

Note: LoBlkLegRep = below average (17%) Black council representation in cities where White respondents reside. HiBlkLegRep = greater than average Black council representation. All differences are significant at $p \leq .05$, two-tailed test.

the fact that Black political office holding is well established in the cities examined here, these results suggest that the causal mechanism behind symbolic representation espoused by Abramson (1983) is correct: the psychological effects of Black representation manifest as a result of real changes in substantive policies. In other words, our findings indicate that Black descriptive representation in local government likely accounts for some of the variation in the distribution of policing policies and practices across cities, and that it is these substantive policies that ultimately shape Black and White attitudes.

By including individual-, neighborhood-, and city-level covariates of political trust and explicitly analyzing the links between descriptive representation, substantive policy, and individual political attitudes, our study breaks new ground and sheds important new empirical light on what contributes to political trust and why some Americans are more trusting than others. Although further tests with longitudinal data are needed to fully test these relationships, our empirical investigation of the differential effects of Black descriptive representation on Black and White Americans' trust in local institutions represents one of the most comprehensive tests to date.

Overall, our findings extend conventional conceptualizations of the implications of descriptive representation for Blacks while also raising additional questions about the symbolic value and racial threat of Black political representation for Whites.

Notes

1. Some studies also find mixed or no results (see, e.g., Karnig and Welch 1980; Mladenka 1989; Pelissero, Holian, and Tomaka 2000; Tate 2003).

2. *Black empowerment* is defined by Bobo and Gilliam (1990, 378) as "the extent to which a group has achieved significant representation and influence in political decision-making." Areas were classified as high Black empowerment if respondents from the primary sampling unit (PSU) had a Black mayor. Areas without a Black mayor or that had a Black mayor but were defined as small cities were classified as low empowerment (p. 380).

3. The study was sponsored by a variety of different organizations, which decided the specific area(s) to be surveyed, how many interviews to conduct, and whether specific areas or ethnic groups would be over-sampled. In most cases, the survey area was one county or a cluster of contiguous counties; some of the area samples are municipalities and others are entire states. Most of the area surveys used proportionate sampling; that is, subareas or population groups were neither over- or under-sampled. Finally, most area samples ranged in size from 500 to 1,500 respondents (for more information, see http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/dataacq/scc_bench.html#download).

4. The SCCBS is ideal for investigating questions that take local context into account (see also Campbell 2005; DeLeon and Naff 2004; Rahn and Rudolph 2005).

5. We conducted the analyses with both the original four-category response set (0 = *not at all*, 1 = *a little*, 2 = *some*; 3 = *a lot*) and the binary response variables. Since our results did not change appreciably, we focus here only on the binary response variable. Although we would like to have considered trust in additional institutions, none of those included in the survey (trust in other races, people at work, neighbors, people working in local shops, the media) is reasonably affected by Black political incorporation. Thus we limit our analysis to trust in local government and local policing.

6. We use the average because it represents a more accurate picture of Black political incorporation in local government than would just one year (2000). However, the two measures are extremely highly correlated ($r = .84$), and none of our results changed when we substituted Black representation on city council in 2000. The results were also unchanged when a legislative parity measure, which tests a slightly different aspect of representation, was used instead of the percent Black on the council.

7. The majority of studies investigating Black empowerment have focused solely on the election of a Black mayor (see, e.g., Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984). However, the representation of Black elected officials in legislative positions provides additional symbolic representation and may indicate higher levels of policy responsiveness.

8. The original coding is as follows: 1 = *very conservative*, 2 = *moderately conservative*, 3 = *middle of the road*, 4 = *moderately liberal*, 5 = *very liberal*.

9. The Herfindahl index is computed by the following formula: EQUATION, where i represents the city, k represents the racial groups Whites, African Americans, Hispanics, Asian/Pacific Islanders, and "others," and S_{ki} represents the proportion of the racial/ethnic group in the city. Data on racial/ethnic composition of the city come from the 2000 census.

10.   Education is coded from 1 to 7, corresponding to the following categories: less than high school (grade 11 or less), high school diploma (including GED), some college, associate's degree (two year) or specialized technical training, bachelor's degree, some graduate training, graduate or professional degree.

11.   Additional controls, such as measures of performance based on respondents' evaluations of incumbent officials, specific city services, or overall satisfaction with local government would provide greater leverage in discerning how trust is linked to substantive representation. Unfortunately, no such measures exist in the SCCBS survey.

12.   The survey question asked respondents "whether most people can be trusted, you can't be too careful, or it depends." *Generalized trust* = 1 if respondents said most people could be trusted; 0 otherwise.

13.   Although there are multiple methods capable of dealing with the statistical problems associated with clustered data, as Steenbergen and Jones (2002, 234–5) note, the decision regarding which method to use should depend on the focus of the study. More specifically, they argue that if dependency between observations within a cluster is not of substantive interest but rather a "statistical nuisance," then approaches such as svyprobit and robust variance estimation may be more suitable than multilevel techniques like hierarchical linear modeling (see also Lee, Forthofer, and Lorimor 1989; Zorn 2001). Since we are substantively interested in estimating the effects of covariates (regardless of data level) conditional on the respondent's race, we estimate separate models for Blacks and Whites and do not specify hypotheses that involve random coefficients between data levels.

14.   We recognize concerns regarding aggregate measures that have been constructed with individual-level survey measures. Indeed, because many published articles exploring the effects of contextual measures rely on national samples, they tend to be particularly susceptible to this problem (e.g., Oliver 2000). As the note below Table 1 indicates, the number of respondents by city is sufficient to ensure that this measure is reasonably representative. Nevertheless, we drop the measure from our baseline models to demonstrate that its exclusion does not alter our findings.

15.   These results hold up when the *Black Mayor* and *Percent Black Council* variables are included separately and when a variable measuring the tenure of Black mayors in the city (since 1995) is used instead of the binary measure indicating the presence of a Black mayor in 2000. Correlations between these two variables are 0.197 and 0.494 in the subsample of Whites and Blacks, respectively. These results are available from the authors by request.

16.   The Pearson coefficient is less than 0.3 for all pairwise and partial correlations among city-level variables, with one exception: r(racial/ethnic heterogeneity, city size) = .62.

17.   The same mechanism may be at work with regard to the relationship between racial/ethnic heterogeneity and trust in local government for Blacks. In other words, increasing heterogeneity may be associated with a set of more general policies of local governments, which are in turn associated with greater trust in local government among Blacks.

18.   In Black mayor versus non-Black mayor cities these figures are $338 and $310 versus $224 and $190 in the Black and White subsamples, respectively. For Black council representation they are $313 and $231 in cities with above-average Black representation and $237 and $213 for cities with below-average representation for Blacks and Whites, respectively.

19.   The other Black mayor cities include: Bessemer and Birmingham, Alabama; Atlanta, Georgia; Cleveland and East Cleveland, Ohio; Denver, Colorado; Detroit, Michigan; Minneapolis, Minnesota, Rochester, New York, and Wilmington, Delaware.

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