e.polis Volume XVI, Fall 2025
Open Submission Article
Public Subsidies for Stadiums and Civic Discourse: A Comparative Study of Milwaukee’s Recent Experiences
Jack Rongstad, M.S. Student in Urban Studies, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Estimated reading time: 25 minutes
Abstract
This exploratory comparative case study examines Milwaukee’s two most recent ballpark subsidies: the 1996 five-county sales tax that funded Miller Park and the 2023 package, which commits just under $500 million to American Family Field, as iterations of the same political technology. Using document analysis, secondary literature, and an interview with former State Senator Joe Wineke, I trace how the terrain of decision-making has shifted from messy local contestation (recalls, talk radio mobilizations, visible coalition splits) to a smoother, state-level, post-political channel where bipartisan elites deliver outcomes behind a façade of inevitability, even amid a record budget surplus and broad public skepticism. The comparison foregrounds three dynamics: (1) the consolidation of leverage by franchise owners and allied landholders under the PPP banner; (2) Wisconsin’s degraded democratic circuitry, gerrymandered maps, legislative-executive brinkmanship, that narrows venues for dissent; and (3) the eclipse of local media ecosystems that once amplified conflict into accountability. Taken together, these dynamics normalize the redirection of public wealth toward private entertainment infrastructure while Milwaukee’s racialized austerity deepens. The point is not that subsidies are “new,” but that their circulation has been re-routed to minimize friction, producing durable outcomes that are politically low-visibility and socially high-impact
Introduction
This paper examines two cases where the State of Wisconsin approved subsidies for the construction (1996) and then the maintenance (2023) of American Family Field, home of the Major League Baseball (MLB) franchise, the Milwaukee “Brewers.” The first case examines the passage of a sales tax implemented across five nearby counties to fund the construction of the stadium. The vote proved hugely controversial and was subject to extensive debates in the State’s legislature before passing with a single-vote majority. Notably, the vote led to the recall of a Republican state senator whose last-minute support of the bill proved crucial to its passage. Construction was completed in 2001, and the stadium, initially named ‘Miller Park,’ was recently sold and renamed ‘American Family Field’ in 2021.
In 2018, two years before the sales tax was set to expire, an independent company was hired to calculate an estimated cost for all maintenance and repair costs through 2040. The company returned with a figure of $71.8 million.[1] However, the Brewers were quick to dispute the claim. They commissioned an internal audit that came back with a much larger figure of $448 million, declining to comment on how they came to that number.[2]
Today, the bargaining position held by the Brewers appears to be far weaker than it was in the late 1990s. The organization cannot rely on the cash-strapped county and municipal governments, which have just provided over $100 million to subsidize the construction of Fiserv Forum (2019) in an effort to retain the city’s NBA franchise after it made similar threats of relocation. Unlike the Fiserv Forum, American Family Field is located on the outskirts of Milwaukee in a district that, although once the industrial heart of Wisconsin, is now sparsely populated by warehouses and vacant lots. Opposition to the project is prevalent, with one poll finding 55% of State residents are against providing subsidies and an even larger 70% who believe the funds should be used to fund public infrastructure instead.[3]
Yet, unlike the dramatic battle over the 5-county sales tax in 1996, the bill to provide the franchise with just under $500 million in subsidies has moved through the state Legislature in short order.[4] Even more unusual is the bipartisan support for the measure in a state with a particularly dysfunctional relationship between its democratic governor and an entrenched republican legislature. The governor would sign the bill on December 7th, 2023.[5]
As exploratory research, this study aims to gain a deeper understanding of the unique circumstances surrounding the push for subsidies. Although the use of public funds for sports stadium construction is not a new phenomenon and has been relatively well-studied, several aspects of this case may offer fresh insight into the evolution of the phenomenon. As noted above, Wisconsin is a state with a democracy under stress, with the subsidies for American Family Field offering an opportunity to examine the political process at play. Despite a significant budget surplus, political polarization has prevented the use of these funds in most cases.
Due to the exploratory nature of this cross-case study, the question guiding the early phase of research was: What can a comparison of the two projects reveal about the evolving role of public-private partnerships and stadium-led development? To answer that question, this paper first details the passage of the 1996 sales tax, then draws comparisons with the present day. Such comparisons aim to chart the trajectory of not only the public-private partnerships formed to fund the stadium’s construction, but also the state’s broader sociopolitical climate.
Literature Review
The Entrepreneurial City
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), in the context of sports stadium development, are individual real estate development projects undertaken jointly by both the state and a private entity. Although such partnerships have existed for much of the United States’ history, they took off as federal aid to cities dried up throughout the 1970s. As austerity continued at the federal and then the state levels, local governments found themselves responsible for an increasing number of basic services. Land-rich but cash-poor, local governments increasingly turned to PPPs to fund any capital improvement projects that needed funding. Major League Sports Facilities emerged as a primary target of PPPs, alongside waterfront revitalization projects, festival markets, and convention centers.[6]
Confronted with austerity from above, and grassroots opposition to highways and other disruptive public projects from below, local governments have almost universally embraced this “entrepreneurial” approach to urban development. It is no wonder, then, that over the past four decades, state and local governments have invested billions in traditionally private projects. As Judith Long notes, despite the primacy of this urban development approach, there has been a “surprisingly meager critical response from the public policy community, often providing little more than a description of those efforts.”[7]
The literature examines the three types of arguments used by boosters in favor of subsidies: the Economic Argument, the Development Argument, and the Symbolic Argument. Despite claims of stadiums acting as anchors for urban development, scholarly research consistently challenges the economic benefits, revealing localized impacts rather than widespread growth.
Economic Magnet
The use of stadiums as a tool to anchor urban development projects has been a common strategy employed by U.S. cities for decades. These mega projects have been increasingly heavily subsidized with public funds, often after a franchise threatens to relocate. Several scholars highlight the new “locational flexibility,” which facilitates a franchise’s search for better economic positions.[8] Often pointing to the success of Baltimore’s stadium-led development strategy, civic boosters argue that arena construction creates an “agglomeration effect” by acting as an anchor for economic development in the surrounding area.[9] On these grounds, public subsidies are frequently justified by boosters promising future economic growth in the stadium’s surrounding area despite an overwhelming amount of scholarly research that finds little to no economic benefits.[10]
The literature on stadium development is diverse, with numerous quantitative studies assessing a project’s economic impact on surrounding neighborhoods and the broader metropolitan area. As noted above, scholars find this “economic magnet” argument unconvincing. Any potential economic impact appears highly localized when considering economic data from the wider metropolitan area. Therefore, scholars conclude that stadium development merely redistributes growth rather than creating it.[11] That said, even areas directly surrounding a new stadium experience uneven growth. As property values rise, any economic spillover goes toward those who own the surrounding land through higher rents, negating any promised growth in wages or jobs.[12]
Judith Long’s recent authoritative study shows a systemic omission of public expenditures on land and infrastructure. These are often simple errors caused by the difficulty in assessing these increasingly byzantine leases and tax breaks.[13] Furthermore, public partners and teams rarely invest similar amounts of money. A clear trend can be seen in these deals, that they are highly unequal, with the public share often dwarfing the amount put up by the highly profitable franchises themselves.[14] Despite significant efforts from the academic and public policy communities, public spending on sports facilities continues unabated. Clearly, these franchises have proven highly adaptable to shifting economic and political conditions.
Stadium building, as a tool for redevelopment, occurs in cities of all sizes. A wide variety of literature focuses on how smaller cities build minor league stadiums to revitalize their urban core. Consistent with findings from larger cities, a majority of these studies find that minor league stadiums tend to concentrate rather than create growth. However, most stadium-led development occurs in larger cities targeting their Central Business District (CBD) for revitalization.
Although the 1960s brought broadcast rights to sports franchises, leading some to realize there was real money to be made, it was really in the 1990s that these franchises began to become hugely profitable. Despite these rising profits, leagues have been able to extract higher and higher subsidies from the public. Part of the reason for their continued success in extracting subsidies lies in the so-called “monopoly context” these franchises enjoy. Research notes how leagues carefully manage franchise supply, “ensuring a sustained unmet demand by cities for franchises.”[15]
In the past, these public subsidies have been provided by the surrounding county or municipal governments. However, the amount of funding provided at the local level has become increasingly inadequate for meeting the demands of major league franchises. As a result, the past decade has seen State-level governments step in to shoulder the burden. The trend can be partly explained by the need to spread a tax incidence over a larger base, but it also points to the greater political influence held by franchise owners. Today, major league teams tend to be owned by wealthier, more influential individuals than their counterparts in the 1960s-70s.[16]
Public Discourse and “Civic Pride”
Although considerable research has been conducted on the economic impact of these projects, less is understood about the effect that a project’s success or failure has on public discourse. To gain support for these projects, boosters tend to appeal to “civic pride” and the potential consequences if a major franchise were to follow through on their threats to relocate.[17] Despite these threats, the public is increasingly skeptical of the perceived benefits of these public/private partnerships.[18] Numerous polls consistently show that people prefer these funds to be allocated to infrastructure or other public projects instead of financing stadiums. In the mid-’90s, growing public awareness of the shortcomings in proposed investments compelled advocates to explore alternative strategies for securing public funds.[19]
Several studies analyze stadium projects that never materialized or were deemed ‘failures,’ partly because these projects have an overwhelming tendency to succeed.[20] Scholars seeking to understand why these projects meet little resistance theorize that the motivations behind stadium development are driven by “collective foolishness and rent-seeking.”[21] At the same time, the increasing absence of referendums for these state-sponsored projects is evident in the cases this paper will focus on, which can be made sense of as a form of civic paternalism, where elites decide what is best for a city without consulting the public.[22]
Although the use of public funds for sports stadium construction is not a new phenomenon and has been relatively well-studied, several aspects of this case may provide further insight into the evolution of the phenomenon. As noted above, Wisconsin is a state with a democracy under stress, with the subsidies for American Family Field offering an opportunity to examine the political process at play. Despite a significant budget surplus, political polarization has prevented the use of these funds in most cases.[23] This paper describes the passage of the 1996 sales tax. It draws comparisons with the present day to better map the trajectory of not only the public-private partnerships formed to fund the stadium project, but also the state’s broader political climate.
Methodology
This paper gathers data from public documents, news articles, and local stakeholders to gain a deeper understanding of the varying circumstances and reactions to each case. As exploratory research, this paper employs both inductive and deductive approaches to coding data, situating Milwaukee’s experience within the broader literature on the public subsidization of stadiums.
This study can also be viewed as historical research, as it will examine documentary evidence left by key actors involved in the development of, and the reaction to, the conflict over using public funds for the construction and subsequent maintenance of American Family Field. It is essential to acknowledge that the nature of historical research means that documents preserved for study most often come from those in power. Although this study will attempt to use diverse sources, voices will inevitably be left out. The primary drawback when conducting qualitative research and content analysis is the difficulty in producing generalizable knowledge. Because this research is primarily exploratory, findings will be produced inductively.[24]
Data and Subjects
Data for the present-day legislative push for further public funds were gathered through various contemporary news publications and other media collected from online databases. Specifically, data were gathered from government records and town hall meetings through Legistar, as well as through a variety of documentary evidence, which provided an overview of public discourse.
Archival research on the sales-tax subsidy debates that took place throughout the 1990s was collected in tandem with secondary sources that provided crucial historical context. Historical documents were supplemented by an interview with a key opposition figure, former State Senator Joe Wineke, who was involved in the 1996 sales tax that funded the stadium’s construction. Ideally, further interviews would be conducted with the figures involved in both cases if this research were to be continued. Interviews follow the responsive interviewing guidelines detailed by Herbert and Irene Rubin.[25] As the subjects interviewed had in-depth expertise, the initial questions evolved as themes were inductively generated. A question guide is included with the appendix.
Interview transcripts, meeting observations, and archival data, such as newspaper articles, were coded inductively. Research was generally gathered with the goal of achieving saturation. The coding process itself was informed by the interview conducted. Articles and archival documents were categorized into three distinct areas: the role of news media, the role of democratic institutions, and the role of corporations. Ideally, it would allow me to uncover any underlying themes for further analysis.
By comparing each case, this study aims to contribute to the growing body of scholarship seeking to understand the changes occurring within this urban planning paradigm. By closely examining how public funds are allocated to construct private stadiums today and contrasting them with a nearly identical case from the late 1990s, this study can reveal any underlying realities that might otherwise be obscured.
Historical Context
A Public Bailout
In 1970, Milwaukee car dealer Bud Selig acquired the struggling Seattle Pilots, a baseball team that had finished dead last in its lone year of existence, for $10.8 million. Nearly two decades later, in 1989, Selig sought permission to construct a new baseball stadium on state land. Remarkably, the funding for this new park would come entirely from the franchise, with no burden on taxpayer dollars. Choosing a location in the once industrial and blighted west side of Milwaukee, Selig strategically limited fan options for amenities like eating, drinking, and parking during games.[26]
This decision triggered significant controversy in the ensuing months, and the later battle over the sales tax may have been avoided had the stadium been situated downtown. Milwaukee Mayor John Norquist, a vocal proponent of downtown revitalization, actively opposed the west side location. Recognizing the potential economic impact of a downtown stadium, Mayor Norquist nearly succeeded in pressuring the Brewers to relocate their stadium to Milwaukee’s struggling city center. Despite Mayor Norquist’s efforts, the decision to place the stadium in the industrial west side prevailed, setting the stage for subsequent challenges and debates surrounding the financing and construction of the new ballpark.[27]
In the meantime, a highway that passed through the land Bud Selig wanted would need to be moved before construction could begin. The Greater Milwaukee Committee (GMC), a group comprising the most influential civic elites, would cover the $8 million cost of the rerouting. Over five years later, with the highway moved and infrastructure in place, Selig met with Governor Tommy Thompson to deliver unexpected news, he couldn’t afford to build the stadium.[28]
The Governor, described by one State Senator as the bill’s “biggest cheerleader,” was immediately on board with using public funds to bail Selig out.[29] In 1995, a statewide referendum proposing a lottery to fund the stadium was soundly rejected by voters at a 2-1 ratio. Undaunted, the Governor went to the State Legislature with a plan to enact a 0.1% sales tax in five of the counties surrounding the stadium. The issue sparked deep divisions in the state’s legislature, resulting in months of negotiations and intense public engagement. Legislators reported receiving death threats on both sides of the issue.[30]
When it was finally brought before the Senate, they voted the bill down twice, each time by a single vote. Around 2 am, Senator George Petak entered Governor Thompson’s office, leaving having changed his mind, he would vote in favor of the sales tax. Petak faced recall by furious voters in Racine a few months later, only to be promptly rehired by Governor Thompson as associate director of the Wisconsin housing and economic development agency.[31]
Subsidy Package Today: “Similar but Different”
When the stadium was finished in 2001, the franchise had narrowly won the battle for public subsidies, partly by claiming there would be no further calls for taxpayer dollars until 2040. The five-county sales tax, implemented for the construction and ongoing maintenance of American Family Field, has generated $609 million to date. However, this number balloons to $1.5 billion when including tax exemptions, federal and otherwise.[32] In 2018, two years before the stadium tax expired, an outside assessment projected just $71.8 million in maintenance through 2040.[33] The Brewers countered with their own audit, inflating the estimate to $610 million for the then–22-year-old ballpark.[34]
Breaking down the 2023 subsidy bill, the largest cost is for “interiors”: seat replacements, suite upgrades, and kitchens for suites.[35] Understanding modern sports economics is crucial to grasping the genuine public cost. Today, a substantial share of baseball teams’ profits stems from the sale of luxury “box” seating. These premium seats are primarily targeted at corporations, which leverage sports tickets as a “business-entertainment deductible.” Corporations assert that acquiring these seats serves as a perk to attract clients, ultimately leading to the federal government subsidizing a portion of each ticket, provided the company declares profits for the deduction. This empowers owners to set exorbitant prices for box seats, with corporations viewing these purchases as tax write-offs, resulting in new facilities often being prematurely labeled as “obsolete” solely due to a perceived shortage of suites.[36]
The original proposal called for $5 million from Milwaukee County and $2.5 million from the city in “annual payments over the next 27 years.” However, after short negotiations with the Republican-controlled Legislature, Milwaukee’s Mayor Cavalier Johnson was “able to get a good deal” on how much money would be extracted from the local tax base. The final version halved the annual subsidies expected from the County to $2.5 million and allowed the city to redirect a state admin fee on a new local sales tax passed that year to cover its portion of the subsidies.[37] This amendment effectively quelled any existing opposition. When Governor Tony Evers signed the bill on December 5th, it included just under $500 million in public funds and $110 million from team owner Mark Attanasio.
Discussion
Subsidies and the Post-Political
One of the chief problems with using a sales tax to finance stadium projects is its reliance on consumer spending. The economy must continue to grow at the same rate; if not, the tax would have to be extended or even increased. This is precisely what happened in Milwaukee, as the 2008 recession hit the area hard. In 2009, the sales tax was extended when the Miller Park stadium district announced a 29% decrease in collected revenue for the previous year. Ultimately, the tax went on for six years longer than planned.[38] As a regressive tax, this burden disproportionally falls on those who can least afford it. However, the end of the sales tax does not necessarily mean the new subsidy package is any more equitable.
Mark Attanasio, worth around $750 million, is the new owner of the Brewers on behalf of investment firm Crescent Capital Group (CCG). The change from former owner Bud Selig, a local who owned car dealerships, to CCG, a massive investment firm specializing in below-credit-grade markets, represents the increasing profitability of the industry. With more wealth and an understanding that a lighter touch was needed, the Brewers came out with nearly everything they had requested in their initial round of negotiations.
Even the $110 million pledged from team owner Mark Attanasio is slightly misleading. That money starts arriving in the decades to come and dilutes in actual value through the years, not to mention the $60 million from American Family Insurance for naming rights, which all goes to the Brewers.[39] After backroom negotiations, the package moved swiftly through the Legislature. In 2023, the Brewers spent more on lobbying in the first half of the year than any other organization in Wisconsin, with a reported figure of $575,000.[40] Former State Senator Joe Wineke, involved with the former sales-tax debate, points out: “No one with money would put together a group to fight something like this.” This, according to Wineke, made the subsidies passage inevitable, that “these things have a way of passing.”[41]
Powerlessness and Democracy in Wisconsin
The decline in political participation in Wisconsin is marked by issues of powerlessness, notably exacerbated by gerrymandering. Research on defective political maps in Wisconsin reveals findings that indicate the dilution of Democratic votes, reflecting broader dysfunction within the legislative and political systems.[42] This dysfunction is further highlighted in “America Gerrymanders On,” portraying an erosion of democracy in the United States, with Wisconsin as a key example.[43]
The very existence of Wisconsin’s record surplus of $7.1 billion owes itself to a complete breakdown between the legislative and executive branches in Madison. Much of the surplus is attributed to federal aid sent in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Governor Tony Evers, a Democrat, strove to use the funds to expand healthcare infrastructure, while the tightly controlled Republican State Legislature wants to cut taxes for the highest income bracket.[44]
The Decline of Local Media
The decline of local news media further contributes to a relative absence of political awareness and discourse. Diverse news sources play a crucial role in shaping public opinion. John Bartel, in his study on the involvement of newspapers in promoting Milwaukee’s stadium project, attributes the controversy to the diversity of news sources. Content analysis performed on five of the city’s leading publications found that 39.6% of articles were positive, 28.2% neutral, and 32.2% were negative.[45] Key stakeholders interviewed backed Bartel’s point, but saw the advent of local “talk-radio” political pundits as the primary driver behind public outrage in the 1990s. When asked to explain why the battle over subsidies in the 1990s proved so dramatic, as opposed to the relative lack of opposition to this new round of subsidies, one former State Senator points to the absence of local media today.[46]
Conclusions
Declining Participation in the Political Process
As exploratory research, the primary goal of this cross-case study is to identify areas where further research may yield more promising results. By comparing each case, three themes emerged with implications for the broader field of urban studies. The first is the growing influence of increasingly wealthy corporations and individuals on public-private partnerships. Specifically, the little democratic input involved in past projects can be easily eroded when subsidies enter the realm of the “post-political.” The impact that a dysfunctional democracy has on subsidy debates is another area calling for study. There is little doubt that the inability of the legislature to work with Wisconsin’s Governor, and vice versa, on how to spend their federal relief funds had some impact on the speedy passage of this new round of subsidies. Finally, the monopolization of voters’ attention by national media, rather than local, seemed to be a key difference between the two cases. The rise of talk radio, even amidst an already struggling local news industry, led to the sales-tax battle being so contentious that one senator was recalled. Today, only one local newspaper exists, and its coverage of the subsidy debate, as well as the impact of this coverage, warrants further study.
Moreover, this study reinforces the undeniable connection between the allocation of public funds, whether for sports stadiums or other ventures, and the perpetuation of racial and economic inequalities. The allocation of resources towards luxury amenities for profitable sports teams, particularly in the face of ongoing austerity measures affecting marginalized communities, raises ethical concerns that warrant constant scrutiny.
The persistent pattern of Milwaukee facing cuts to city services while subsidizing sports teams underscores the need for a critical reevaluation of the supposed economic windfall associated with such investments. Milwaukee County, grappling with various challenges, including an underfunded pension system, confronts economic struggles disproportionately affecting the African American community. The city’s current status with the lowest black median household income in the nation and a 33.1% black poverty rate demands urgent attention and calls for a reexamination of policy priorities.[47]
Appendix
Question Guide
Could you describe your background, and involvement with the passage of the subsidy package for the Brewers in 1996?
Can you talk about the key supporters of the bill?
Follow up: What role did lobbying play in the push to build Miller Park?
How was the sales tax sold to the legislature?
Can you talk about the role played by Brewers owner, Bud Selig?
What groups opposed the bill?
Follow up: Can you talk about Mayor Norquist and the push to build the stadium in Milwaukee’s downtown?
What are your thoughts on the Brewer’s current push for further subsidies?
Follow up: If you were comparing it to the first push for subsidies in the late 90s, what similarities do you see? Differences?
In your opinion, what made this most recent round of subsidies pass with little controversy?
When comparing the political climate and culture on the 90s to today, what if anything would you say has changed?
Follow up: Can you talk about the role of the public in 1996? Today?
Are there any other important people involved, past or present, whose insight would be beneficial to this study?
Is there anything you would like to add that we didn’t discuss?
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[1] Mortenson Company, Review of Segregated Reserve Fund Master Plan, (2023).
[2] Bruce Murphy, “Civic Blackmail Works For Brewers Again,” in Urban Milwaukee, (Nov 14th, 2023), https://urbanmilwaukee.com/2023/11/14/murphys-law-why-the-brewers-wont-skip-town/
[3] Dan Adams, Milwaukee Works, Public Policy Polling, (2023).
[4] Eventually ballooning to over $600 million
[5] Evan Casey, “Gov. Tony Evers signs Brewers stadium bill, ensuring team stays in city until 2050,” Wisconsin Public Radio, (12/5/2023), https://www.wpr.org/gov-tony-evers-signs-brewers-stadium-bill-ensuring-team-stays-city-until-2050
[6] Judith Grant Long. Public/Private Partnerships for Major League Sports Facilities. New York: Routledge, (2013), 6.
[7] Long, 4.
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